INTRODUCTION
The United States Sentencing Commission enacted the Sentencing Guidelines in an attempt to establish a fair and effective federal sentencing system. 1 This system instituted sentencing ranges which the sentencing court must apply when sentencing all offenders. 2 The Commission recognized, however, that there are certain factors relevant to a crime or criminal for which the general Guidelines could not fully account. 3 Therefore, the Commission established policy statements which enabled the sentencing court to depart from the applicable Guideline when certain factors exist. 4 One such policy statement is United States Sentencing Guideline § 5K2.13, which allows the court to use the defendant's reduced mental capacity as a mitigating factor in sentencing. 5 Section 5K2.13 sets out three requirements for departure. The defendant must have (1) committed a non-violent offense (2) while suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity which contributed to the commission 3 Id. 4 Id. Departure provisions were included in the Guidelines in order to further the basic purposes of the guidelines which were uniformity, proportionality and honesty. See U.S.S.G., ch. 1., pt. A(3), at 2-3, 5-6 (1993); 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2) (1993); se4 e.g., U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. 5 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13: If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants, a lower sentence may be warranted to reflect the extent to which reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense, provided that the defendant's criminal history does not indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public.
Id. (emphasis added).
they have applied a fact specific inquiry to determine whether the underlying conduct was indeed non-violent. 12 This Comment suggests that the current interpretations of "nonviolent offense" are inconsistent with the underlying purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines and § 5K2.13 in particular, because they fail to adequately balance a determinate system with the leniency intended by § 5K2.13. The courts adopting the majority approach fail to recognize textual difficulties with their analysis, as well as the leniency espoused by § 5K2.13. The courts adopting the minority rationale have failed to offer sufficient guidance to the sentencing court. Therefore, this Comment offers a new approach that balances these competing interests.
To better understand the following discussion, Part II briefly discusses the history of sentencing and sets forth the concerns confronting Congress when promulgating the Sentencing Guidelines. Part III discusses the approach taken by the majority of the federal circuits. It analyzes the rationale of the approach and offers criticisms of its rationale. Part IV summarizes the minority approach and sets forth criticisms of its interpretation. Part V then proposes a revision of § 5K2.13 in light of the current provision's failure to provide the just sentencing scheme envisioned by Congress when establishing the Guidelines and its policy statements.
II. HISTORY
For most of the past century, the federal government's system of sentencing criminals was largely indeterminate.'1 While statutes specified penalties for crimes, they typically gave the sentencing court broad discretion to decide whether the offender should be incarcerated, for how long, and whether some other form of punishment, such as probation or a fine, should be imposed in place of imprisonment.' 4 This system was supplemented by parole, which allowed the offender to return to society earlier than his sentence would have allowed under the "guidance and control" of their parole officer. 15 This system of discretionary sentencing and parole was based on the desire to rehabilitate the offender, thereby minimizing the risk that he would resume criminal activity upon his unsupervised return in 
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to society. 1 6 Each criminal's amenability to rehabilitation was necessarily an ad hoc determination made by the individual's sentencing judge and parole officer. 1 7 Thejudge and parole officer would assess the criminal's amenability to rehabilitation before handing down the sentencing and release decisions.' 8 Therefore, sentencing officials exercised great discretion. 19 The wide discretion exercised by sentencing officials, however, led to serious disparities in sentences. 20 Also, the indeterminate sentencing system produced high recidivism rates. Critics questioned rehabilitation as a theory of punishment and regarded its goals as unattainable in most cases. 2 ' Therefore, Congress determined that a new system, which incorporated alternative theories of punishment, was necessary.
22
The first step in moving away from the discretionary system came in 1958, when Congress authorized the creation ofjudicial sentencing institutes and joint councils, whose purpose was to formulate sentencing standards.
23
In 1973, still unhappy with the system of sentencing currently in place, the United States Parole Board adopted guidelines that established a "customary range" of confinement. 24 In 1976, Congress endorsed this initiative through the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act.
2 5 In that act, Congress attempted to give the Parole Commission a role in moderating "the disparities in the sentencing practices of individualjudges." 26 Under the new system, the judge continued to set the sentence within the statutory range fixed by Congress, while the Parole Commission set the prisoner's actual release date.
This indeterminate sentencing system failed in two respects. Second, the system created uncertainty as to the time the offender would actually serve in prison. 2 9 Race, sex, and the region in which the defendant was convicted, among other things, caused these differences. 30 These unfair disparities and uncertainties caused a widespread public concern because they proved to be a serious impediment to an evenhanded and effective criminal justice system. Congress recognized the need for a new system because these new approaches failed to cure the "shameful" and "unjustified" conse- 
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The main goal of the Sentencing Reform Act was to channel judicial discretion through a highly structured sentencing scheme designed to promote honesty, 3 5 uniformity, and proportionality 6 in sentencing. 3 7 To promote honesty, Congress eliminated the parole system for federal prisoners sentenced after the Commission instituted the Guidelines. 3 8 As a result, a sentence imposed by the court would be the sentence served in prison, less approximately fifteen percent reduction for good behavior. 3 9 To promote uniformity and proportionality, the Sentencing Reform Act established the Federal Sentencing Commission to promulgate the detailed Sentencing Guidelines which judges must follow when imposing sentences. 40 As part of the Sentencing Reform Act Congress enacted a Guidelines Manual, which set out goals that Congress intended to achieve by enacting the Sentencing Guidelines. 4 (2), intro. cmt. The Parole Board was scheduled to be phased out within five years after the adoption of the Guidelines and all prisoners sentenced under the pre-Guidelines system were to be assigned specific terms of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (1), (3) (1988) . To further promote honesty, all sentences were reviewable for conformity with the law, rather than abuse of discretion. 39 See 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988) . 40 "The United States Sentencing Commission is an independent agency of the judicial branch composed of seven voting and two non-voting, ex-officio members. Its principal purpose is to establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system that will assure the ends ofjustice by promulgating detailed guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes." U.S.S.G., ch.1, pt.A(l), intro. cmt. (1994 
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As can be evidenced by these statements, rehabilitation was no longer the sole theory behind sentencing. 44 Further, Congress intended to totally replace the current system with a more structured scheme designed to limit judicial discretion. 45 Congress also enacted a number of specific directives to further narrow the Commission's drafting discretion. 46 For example, statutes instructed the Commission to take into account the nature and degree of harm caused by the offense, community views and concerns about the gravity of the offenses, and aggravating and mitigating circumstances when establishing offense categories. 4 7 These directives also allowed the Commission to consider the nature and capacity of the correctional facilities and services. 48 Finally, the maximum range of imprisonment for each sentencing category could not exceed the minimum by more than twenty-five percent.
49
These goals led the Commission to create the Sentencing Guidelines, a basically determinate sentencing system. 50 It created a generic sentencing table containing forty-three vertical offense levels and six horizontal criminal history levels. 51 Every federal offense was assigned a base vertical level ranging from level one, the lightest sentence, to level forty-three, the most severe. Similar offenses were grouped into generic categories. All offenders sentenced under the same offense category received the same base offense level.
5 2 The base level would be increased or decreased in exactly the same manner when "specific offense characteristics" were involved. 5 3 A prisoner's sentence could only be reduced by any credit earned while in custody. Federal judges did retain some limited discretion to sentence outside the prescribed guideline range. If the sentencing judge found departure was warranted from the range prescribed by the Guidelines, he must support that finding in a writing stating his reasons. 54 
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authority merely allowed the sentencing judge to depart from the Guidelines when certain mitigating or aggravating factors existed. 55 To promote fairness and leniency, the Guidelines made the existence of a significantly reduced mental capacity one such mitigating factor. 5 6 However, the Commission determined that significantly reduced mental capacity was relevant only where the offender committed a non-violent offense. 5 7
III. THE MAJORITY APPROACH
A. REASONING The majority of the circuits have defined the phrase "non-violent offense" narrowly. 5 8 They have held that the definition of "non-violent offense" is controlled by the definition of "crime of violence" in § 4BI.2. 5 9 As such, the definitions of "non-violent offense" under § 5K2.13 and "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2 are mutually exclusive. 60 cuit offers any detailed explanation to support this definition. 63 Specifically, the court asserted three points to support their approach. First, the court noted that U.S.S.G. § IBl.l(i) directed the court to read the Guidelines as a whole. 64 It reasoned therefore, that since the root word violent appeared in two different, though related sections, it must have the same meaning in both sections. 65 Specifically, the court stated that where the same word was used in both phrases, "a rather heavy load rests on him who would give different meanings to the same word or the same phrase when used a plurality of times in the same Act .... " 66 The court found support for this reasoning in the Armed Career Offender Act, where Congress defined the term "violent felony" in exactly the same manner as the Sentencing Commission defined "crime of violence" in U.S.S.G § 4B1.2. 67 Although the phrases were slightly dissimilar, the court found it "nigh impossible to divine any distinction between a 'violent felony' and a 'violent offense."' 68 Similarly, regarding the Sentencing Guidelines, the court reasoned that had the Commission desired to distinguish among types of violence, it would have expanded its vocabulary. 69 Because the Commission did not, it is "difficult to discern a difference between 'violent offense' and 'crime of violence.' 7 0
The court thus refused to "tease meaning from ... the use of a prepositional phrase [of violence] rather than an adjective [violent] ."71 Second, the Seventh Circuit claimed that every court dealing with the issue concluded that "non-violent offense" is defined by reference to "crime of violence." 7 2 In fact, most courts found the issue so obvi- Cir. 1990 ) (en banc) (defining the word "information" the same in two different tax statutes); Reiche v. Smythe, 80 U.S. 162, 165 (1871) ("Both acts are in pari materia, and it will be presumed that if the same word be used in both, and a special meaning were given it in the first act, that it was intended it should receive the same interpretation in the latter act. 
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ous that they made the determination with little or no discussion. 7 " The court asserted that where every court dealing with an issue came to the same conclusion and the legislative body had failed to take action, that resolution should be presumed correct. 74 The court, therefore, asserted that by failing to respond to this view, the Sentencing Commission had impliedly accepted the majority position. 75 Third, the court argued that any alternative definition would require the courts to guess as to the meaning of "non-violent offense." 76 Even if the Commission intended to define "non-violent offense" differently, the court could "do little but guess as to its mieaning. ' 77 The court noted that when an alternative approach necessitates guesswork on the court's part, it is more prudent to select a definition offered in another section of the statute. 78 The court found it problematic that there was no authority suggesting that the definition of "non-violent offense" would be either more or less restrictive than the definition found in § 4B1.2. 79 When formulating the definition of "non-violent offense," the court would not have anything to guide it except its own beliefs. As such, the court deemed it prudent to apply an available definition of a similar phrase. 8 0 Therefore, the definition of "crime of violence" found in § 4B1.2 was found applicable to the phrase "non- Although the Seventh Circuit offered an in depth discussion of the factors supporting their approach, their analysis fails on many levels. While it was able to assert three points to support its approach, each point is problematic. Additionally, the court failed to take into account the policies incorporated in the Guidelines and in § 5K2.13 in particular. Therefore, the majority approach is not the proper approach to defining the phrase "non-violent offense."
The court's textual analysis fails in four respects. First, there is no authority to read the Guideline in the manner in which the majority suggests. U.S.S.G. § IBl.l(i), which the court used to support its textual analysis, offers no such direction. It merely states that the court should
[r]efer to Part H and K of Chapter Five, specific offender characteristics and departures, and to any other policy statement or commentary in the Guidelines that might warrant consideration in imposing sentence. In fact, the Guidelines prohibit unauthorized cross referencing of definitions. 82 When discussing the applicability of the definitions found in the general definitions section, the Guidelines stated that "[d]efinitions of terms also may appear in other sections. Such definitions are not designed for general applicability." 8 3 Therefore, according to the methods of statutory interpretation mandated by the Guidelines, the definition of "crime of violence" found in § 4B1.2 cannot be used to define "non-violent offense" in § 5K2.13.
Second, it is clear that the same phrase does not exist in both sections. "It would have been easy to write § 5K2.13 to say that the judge may depart unless the defendant committed a 'crime of violence' as § 4B1.2 defines it."84 The Commission, however, elected to use separate formulations in each section, "crime of violence" and "non-violent offense. Therefore, since the two phrases are distinct, they must be defined differently. a 8 Third, the phrase "crime of violence" is a term of art that is not generally applicable to other sections with similar phrases. 8 9 To define a "crime of violence," one must examine the elements of the offense. 90 Where an element of an offense is violence, even the unrealized prospect of violence, that offense is a "crime of violence." 9 1
Further, courts have noted that it is better to define words and phrases according to their normal meaning instead of defining them by using a term of art. 92 The ordinary legal and lay meaning of the phrase "non-violent offense" involves the conduct of the offender and not the element of the offense. 93 Therefore, the same specialized definition does not apply to both sections.
Moreover, the Guidelines themselves suggest different meanings for the phrase "non-violent offense" and "crime of violence." 94 According to § 4B1.2, "crime" encompasses the elements of the felony or misdemeanor which is the subject of the conviction. 95 However, the Guidelines specifically define the term "offense" as "all relevant conduct... "96 Thus, the two nouns in the respective sections are different and each requires a distinct analysis. The word "crime" suggests that the court examine the language of the criminal statute in question to determine whether the criminal defendant acted violently. The word "offense," on the other hand, suggests that the court examine the underlying conduct of the offense, and not merely the statute, to determine the nature of the defendant's actions. nothing to do with determining the elements of a given "crime of violence." 9 8 Therefore, because the definition found in § 4B1.2 examines the elements of the crime, it is incompatible with the Guidelines' suggested definition of "non-violent offense" in § 5K2.13. 9 9 While the majority recognized the difference between the word "offense" and the word "crime," it fails to adequately dispose of the issue and it only addresses the issue in a parenthetical, which is unpersuasive. 10 0 While recognizing that there might be a difference between the terms, the court does not find the distinction significant because "'offense' encompasses a broader spectrum of illegality than does 'crime."' 1 0 ' The court, however, neither explains the ramifications nor offers any authority for this assertion. Therefore, the Commission's different formulations in each section must be given their distinct meanings.
Merely because Congress and the Commission defined other slightly different terms the same as "non-violent offense" is not sufficient to determine that another similar phrase is defined the same. 10 2 The majority attempted to account for the difference between "crime of violence" and "non-violent offense" through a comparison to 18 U.S.C. § 924, the Armed Career Offender Act. There, the phrase "violent felony" is defined the same as "crime of violence."' 0 3 Such a comparison makes sense: both phrases are virtually identical. The only minor difference is that "violent felony" includes only felonies, while "crime of violence" includes both felonies and misdemeanors. More importantly, 18 U.S.C. § 924 and U.S.S.G § 4B1.2 are both career offender provisions. Therefore, both statutes intend to increase punishment for those who are more dangerous and thus deserving of increased incapacitation.
Fourth, in addition to the suggestion within the Guidelines that 
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543 these two phrases be defiied differently, the Commission's lack of a cross-reference between the two sections is significant. 0 4 A cross-reference between the two sections clearly would have alleviated the problem, yet the majority deemed this absence a meaningless oversight.' 0 5 In dismissing this criticism as overly critical hindsight, they found it hardly surprising that the Commission failed to foresee the argument that a crime of violence could, under the sentencing Guidelines, also be a non-violent offense.' 0 6 This conclusion, however, fails to recognize that the Commission did use explicit cross-referencing in other sections. For example, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 expressly adopts the definition of "crime of violence" as found in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.107 At least two other sections in the Sentencing Guidelines expressly adopt the definition of "crime of violence" found in § 4B1.2.' 0 8 Moreover, the Commission has amended § 4B1.2 twice in the last two.years without providing a cross-reference with § 5K2.13.1 0 9 The lack of a crossreference is a curious omission if the two sections were linked as tightly as the majority suggests."1 0 Although drafters sometimes fail to recognize that a similar phrase exists in another section .and, thus, believe the two are equivalent, here the Sentencing Commission wrote the Guidelines as a unit and paid special attention to the relationship among sections. ' As evidence of their care, they amended the Guidelines 359 times over the three years prior to the Poff decision. 112 Had they intended to define the terms the same, they would have stated it explicitly with a cross-reference between sections. Thus, it makes sense to attribute different meanings to the phrases "non-violent offense" and "crime of violence." 1 13
Because the Guidelines offer neither a specific definition or cross-reference, any approach involves guess work. The majority chooses not to apply another definition because they would have to guess the definition of "non-violent offense." 1 4 Because there is no cross-reference in § 5K2.13 that states the definition in § 431.2 is ap- 104 plicable to § 5K2.13, however, the approach used by the majority is also nothing more than guess work." 5 In fact, their approach violates the maxim of statutory interpretation prohibiting the court from adopting an interpretation of a federal criminal statute which increases an individual's penalty when that interpretation is based on a mere guess as to Congress' intent. 1 6 This rule applies equally to sentences as it does to criminal statutes." 7 The majority approach removes the sentencing court's discretion in many situations and thus forces the court to impose higher sentences where they might otherwise want to impose a more lenient one. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit's guess that the definition found in § 4B1.2 applies to § 5K2.13 is no more valid than the approach criticized by the Seventh Circuit.
Further, the majority's approach fails to take into account the maxim giving effect and meaning to each word of a statute." 8 The court could not interpret the language of a statute so as to render words and phrases meaningless. 1 9 The conclusion that the definition of "crime of violence" in § 4B1.2 controls the definition of "non-violent offense" in § 5K2.13 renders that phrase meaningless because it merely becomes an alternative way of saying "crime of violence." This is an unintended result as it is the job of the drafters to create and not to destroy.' 20 The majority's reading violates this rule of statutory construction and renders superfluous the phrase "non-violent offense."'
The problems with the majority's analysis are not limited to the interpretation of the text. The majority's assertion that the circuits were unanimous on this issue is also incorrect. 122 At the time the Seventh Circuit made their assertion in Poffin 1991, the circuit's were not unified. Although they did not expressly adopt an alternative approach, the Tenth Circuit determined the court's authority to depart under § 5K2.13 without making reference to § 4B1.2.12 3 In effect, 
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they used a fact specific inquiry similar to the approach later adopted by the D.C. Circuit. 24 All circuits dealing with the issue had not determined that § 4B1.2 controls the definition of "non-violent offense" found in § 5K2.13. Thus, the Commission's silence is not an implied approval of the majority's view. Further, the Seventh Circuit's analysis also fails to take into account the policies of the Guidelines. In proposing that "non-violent offense" is defined identically to "crime of violence," the court misapplied United States v. Montgomery Ward. 12 At issue in Montgomery Ward was the definition of the word "production" in the War Labor Disputes Act.' 26 To determine the definition, the Seventh Circuit examined the definition of the same word in the Fair Labor Standards Act. 2 7 Both of the Acts set up the mechanism for the settlement of disputes between employer and employee. 28 The only difference was that one statute dealt with peace time disputes and the other with war time disputes. Nevertheless, the purpose of the two Acts, settling labor disputes, was the same.
The same cannot be said here. The policy considerations behind these two sections of the Sentencing Guidelines suggest that they are not in pari materia and thus, the definitions should be different. The two sections have vastly different agendas. Section 4B1.2 asks whether a individual is a career offender and should therefore receive a higher sentence than others who have committed the same offense.' 2 9 The career offender provisions were enacted to punish those offenders that have shown a penchant for committing violent acts, whether they go through with those acts or not. 3 0 These offenders are subject to longer sentences in order to deter criminal conduct, provide just punishment, and protect the public from further crimes by the offender.' 3 ' Thus, § 4B1.2 does not grant the career offender the 124 See Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1450. 125 150 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1945). 126 Id. at 377. 127 Id. 128 Id. 129 See U.S.C. § 994(h) (1988) . Congress here directed the Commission to ensure that the Guidelines specify prison sentences that are at or near the maximum term authorized for career offenders. Those offenders include persons who have been convicted of a felony that is either a crime of violence or a drug offense and who have been previously convicted of two felonies where each was either a crime of violence or a drug offense. On the other hand, the policy concerns motivating § 5K2.13 are entirely distinct. U.S.S.G. § 5K(2.13 wishes to treat with lenity offenders whose reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense.' 3 3 The Commission intended to maintain the usual sentencing practices of judges prior to the enactment of the Guidelines. 134 In the past, judges routinely handed out lower sentences to persons who, though not legally insane, were not in full command of their actions and thus not fully responsible for their actions and not worthy of harsh sentences. To maintain these past practices, the Commission encouraged lower sentences for those with reduced mental capacity.
Also, the rule of lenity suggests that where a "reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope" after an examination of the text and policies of the statute, the court should opt for "the construction yielding the shorter sentence.' u3 5 The policies of § 5K2.13, leniency to those who were not fully responsible for their acts, suggest that the court has the opportunity to grant a shorter sentence to an offender with a diminished mental capacity. To accomplish this goal, the phrase "non-violent offense" should encompass the broadest range of offenses, therefore granting the sentencing court the authority to depart in the broadest of circumstances.
In addition to the policies of the Guidelines, the theories of punishment incorporated into the Guidelines support a lenient reading of § 5K2.13. Two theories of punishment that influence sentencing determinations, the desert and deterrent theories, support leniency when the offender suffers from a diminished mental state. 13 6 Under the desert theory, persons who cannot control their conduct do not deserve as much punishment as those who act with malice or for personal gain, because those who lack self-control are not as blameworthy resources must be targeted on incapacitating" those who repeatedly commit violent crimes); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (Background Note).
132 See U.S.S.G., ch. 134 U.S.S.G., ch. 1, pt. A(3) (1994) (noting that the Commission examined pre-sentencing practices to determine the ranges for the sentencing guidelines.).
135 See United States v. Chapman, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) (stating if a court encounters a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of an act, the court may interpret the act most favorably to the defendant to avoid an absurd or glaring unjust 136 See Poff 926 F.2d at 595 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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as those acting with evil intent Under the deterrent theory, legal sanctions are less effective with people who suffer from diminished mental capacity, because sanctions will not deter someone whose actions are beyond his self-control.
7
Thus, under both theories those with diminished mental capacity deserve less severe punishment Because both the desert and deterrent rationales support departure where the offender suffers from a significantly reduced mental capacity, the critical determination is whether the offender is dangerous.
13 8 If the sentencing court deems the offender dangerous, the court should not have the authority to depart from the Guidelines; however, when the offender is not dangerous, the court should be granted the authority to depart if it wishes. In order to determine whether the offender is dangerous to society, the court must examine the underlying conduct of the offense and not merely the elements of the crime. The majority's examination of the elements of the crime leads to anomalous results. Under the majority's approach, the innocuous threatener is treated exactly the same as a terrorist bomber whose bomb does not explode due to incompetence, because the majority approach treats any threat in the same manner, whether or not the threatener intended to carry out the threat. The Sentencing Commission could not have intended such anomalous results.' 3 9 Instead, where the offense shows that the offender is not dangerous to society' and incarceration would, at most, serve a limited purpose, the court should have the authority to depart if it deems proper. 140 Under such circumstances, it seems "highly implausible that the Sentencing Commission intended to prohibit a downward departure under section 5K2.13."141 143 Here, the courts examine the underlying conduct of the offense to determine whether the offender committed a violent offense. 14 4 The text and the policies of the Guidelines support this approach. 145 The language of the text suggests that the § 5K2.13 definition is distinct from all other phrases in the Guidelines. 146 In addition, the policies of the statute and the Guidelines suggest an alternative definition of "non-violent offense" to the definition of "crime of violence" found in § 4B1.2.
While the minority agrees that the definition of "crime of violence" found in § 4B1.2 does not apply to the definition of "non-violent offense" found in § 5K2.13, adherents disagree on which definition should apply. Some suggest that one definition of a nonviolent offense is an offense that does not involve "mayhem." 14 7 When examining the conduct of the offender, it was " [ t] he prospect of violence (the 'heartland' of the offense, in the Guidelines' argot) [that set] the presumptive range; when things turn[ed] out better than they might, departure [was] permissible."
1 48 This language was the central theory behind the idea that the meaningless threatener should not be treated as a violent offender. The Seventh Circuit dissenters chose to set the presumptive range at the existence of mayhem. 149 Mayhem, defined at common law, required a type of injury which permanently rendered the victim less able to fight offensively or defensively; it might be accomplished either by the removal of (dismemberment), or by the disablement of, some bodily member useful in fighting. Today, by statute, permanent disfigurement has been added; and as to dismemberment and disablement, there is no longer a requirement that the member have military signifi-142 See id. 143 See, e.g., id. at 1452 (establishing a fact specific inquiry into the underlying conduct of each offense to determine whether the offense is non-violent).
144 See id. 145 See supra notes 82 through 141 and accompanying text for a discussion of the criticisms of the rationale supporting the majority approach and, accordingly, the rationale in support of the minority approach. 146 The minority makes one unneeded concession regarding the majority's reasoning by stating that "[a] lthough a textual argument supports this conclusion [that § 4B1.2 controls § 5K2.13], we should not attribute this heartlessness to the Sentencing Commission unless we must-and we needn't." United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir.) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 827 (1991). While it is true that we should not attribute such heartlessness to the Commission, the text does not support such a conclusion. See U.S.S.G. § IB1.1, cmt. n.2 (prohibiting random cross-referencing of context-specific definitions of terms). 147 Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 148 Id. at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 149 See id.
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cance. In many states the crime of mayhem is treated as aggravated assault. 150 Using mayhem as a baseline allows the court to depart when the offender commits certain violent acts that do not reach this level of seriousness or when the offender fails in his attempt at the commission of a serious offense.
Some circuits adopting the minority view, however, have refused to adopt this definition. 151 Instead, those circuits have chosen to examine the specific facts of each case to determine whether the offense was violent or non-violent. 15 2 They offer no definition; instead, it is up to each individual sentencer to determine whether or not the offense entailed violence. The criticisms of the minority approach are limited. The use of an inquiry into the underlying conduct of each case has been questioned. 5 4 However, greater dispute has arisen regarding the alternative definitions applied to determine whether an offense is in fact non-violent, because each is flawed in its own respect. The first definition defines "non-violent" too broadly. However, the second definition's attempt to correct this error does not offer any guidance to courts functioning within a system of limited discretion. Therefore, courts need a new definition that will allow the court sufficient discretion but also give substantial guidance.
Some have criticized the use of an inquiry into the specific facts of each case. 155 The Chatman court noted its authority to examine the facts of each case even when determining the applicability of § 4B1. 886 F.2d at 389 ). The defendant in Baskin had been convicted of possession and intention to distribute drugs. The sentencingjudge was confronted with a complex set of facts. The defendant had been convicted of armed robbery in the past. If that crime was a "crime of amine the facts of a predicate crime to determine whether it was a crime of violence under the career offender provisions of the Guidelines and whether the court could depart from the Guidelines. 5 8 Where such a rule existed, the sentencing court is allowed to examine the facts of each case under § 5K2.13 to determine whether to depart from the Guidelines.
If the rule of Baskin led to the holding in Chatman, however, any circuit without such a precedent would necessarily have to rule that a fact specific inquiry was not applicable. 15 163 See supra notes 82 through 141 and accompanying text for a discussion of the criticisms of the majority approach.
[Vol. 86 
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Poff dissenters attempt to define the phrase, "non-violent offense" as one that does not involve mayhem, 64 they fail to offer any other guidance. Moreover, this definition may cover too few offenses.'
65
Crimes that do not actually result in violence still may indicate that a defendant is "exceedingly dangerous, and should be incapacitated." 166 The Poff dissenters seem to imply that any offender who attempts to commit a violent act but fails due to incompetence should be granted a departure. 167 This says too much. The incompetent criminal should not benefit because "things turned out better than they might." 168 Where the offender exhibits an intention to commit the offense, he should not be given the benefit of his failure to actually carry out the threat. 169 Departing from the Guidelines would run contrary to the purposes of § 5K2.13 because it would give the sentencing court the authority to depart in cases where the offender is dangerous to society.' 7 0
It is clear, however, that the Commission did not intend for the sentencing court to "treat the innocuous threatener and the murderous one identically."' 7 ' In this regard, the Seventh Circuit has found the correct distinction: the important difference between one offender and the next is the objective intention to commit the threatened act.' The D.C. Circuit in Chatman, recognizing difficulties with the Seventh Circuit proposal, applied a fact specific inquiry. 7 3 While the court seemed to suggest the correct resolution, they did not complete the task. In criticizing the approach of Judge Easterbrook, the D.C. Circuit stated that where "an offense.., involved a real and serious threat of violence-such as assault with a deadly weapon" it cannot fall within the realm of offenses characterized as non-violent 74 While the sentencing court need not limit itself to examining whether the offense actually entailed violence or mayhem, it is insufficient to leave the court without a test. 175 Such a solution cuts against the goal of the Sentencing Guidelines-consistency in sentencing throughout jurisdictions' 76 -and, as such, will lead to a regression to the indeterminate sentencing systems of the past.
Although it may be effective in some cases to allow the court to go on a case by case basis, 177 this is not one of those situations. The Guidelines are a comprehensive set of rules that are designed to limit the sentencing court's discretion.' 7 8 Thus, the Supreme Court must offer a definition to the lower sentencing courts.
V. A RESOLUTION
Thus far, the judicial system has failed to adequately define the phrase "non-violent offense." Neither § 5K2.13 nor the Sentencing Guidelines offer an adequate test for courts to apply. Therefore, the courts have been given the difficult task of filling in the blanks left by the Sentencing Commission. The circuits' conflicting approaches have failed to take into account the factors underlying § 5K2.13 in particular and the Sentencing Guidelines in general. A new approach is needed.
179
The Seventh Circuit conceded that there is "an argument in favor of permitting downward departures ... when the prospect that [an offender] will carry through with threats seems nill." 180 Recognizing that rationale, this Comment proposes a new approach in order to achieve the goals of the Sentencing Guidelines and § 5K2.13. It offers the sentencing court a lenient and guided approach to departure under U.S.S.G § 5K2.13.
This approach defines "non-violent offense" as: (1) any course of conduct that does not involve
